LABOUR IN THOSE YEARS

Recalling the Bombay Textile Workers’ Strike, 1982


Babu P. Remesh is Associate Fellow, V.V. Giri National Labour Institute, and Coordinator, Integrated Labour History Research Programme & Archives of Indian Labour. Email: neetbabu@rediffmail.com. (Babu P. Remesh)

1982: A Strike Story 

In the history of industrial conflicts in India, 18 January 1982 is a decisive date because it marks the commencement of an unparallelled, marathon strike of textile workers in Bombay. In the strike that continued for a year-and-a-half, about 250,000 workers of 60 mills participated. The strike challenged the prevailing social dialogue framework in the Bombay textile industry, which had straitjacketed industrial relations in the sector for more than three decades.

 

Taking advantage of the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act (BIRA) of 1946, the Bombay Mill Owners’ Association was negotiating only with a monopoly trade union, Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh (RMMS), which had a weak worker backing. By the 1980s, there was growing skepticism among a majority of textile workers in Bombay apropos the open cooperation between the Mill Owners’ Association and the RMMS. That the RMMS leadership had been complying with the wishes of mill owners and ignoring the grievances of workers was widely understood. This lack of trust in the recognised trade union became more concrete, following the announcement of a bonus agreement, on 20 October 1981. As per this agreement, which offered bonus in the range of 8.33 to 17 per cent, the rate of the bonus was left to the paying capacity of the mills. The workers rejected the agreement. The dissatisfaction of the workers led to spontaneous protests the next day, including a sit down dharna by the workers of 15 mills. Workers of eight other mills too later went on strike (7 mills on the bonus issue and one mill over a local issue). On 23 October 1981, hundreds of textile workers of Standard Mills marched to the residence of a former INTUC leader, Datta Samant, pleading him to take over leadership. By then, Datta Samant had already earned the reputation of being a rebel and a radical among the workers of Bombay; he was known for his commitment to the causes of the working poor and an uncompromising attitude in negotiating with the employers.

 

On 30 October, Datta Samant announced the formation of a new union for textile workers, the Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union (MGKU) and urged the mill owners to announce a new agreement to avoid indefinite strike. Within the next few months, he emerged as the undisputed leader of the textile workers in Bombay, gaining the confidence of thousands of workers and hitting heavily on the membership base of RMMS. stimates suggest that within the first three months of its inception, the membership of MGKU went up to an impressive figure of 1,75,000. This massive mobilisation of industrial workers eventually led to the commencement of a historic and protracted strike in January 1982. This is considered a turning point, not only in the history of textile workers in Bombay, but also in the socio-cultural and economic history of the city itself.

 

A few days before the commencement of the indefinite strike, Datta Samant appealed for a one-day strike on 6 January 1982. The strike had the widespread backing of the workers, despite an open appeal from the President of RMMS to the workers to not take part in the stopping of work. The overwhelming success of this one-day strike testified to the undisputed popularity and acceptance of MGKU among the textile workers.

 

The Strike and its Impact

The period prior to the strike was characterised by a marked deterioration of working conditions, low wages and exploitation under badli (contract) work. Accordingly, the demands of the strike included a rise in wages and improvements in the conditions of employment. The monthly wage increase sought ranged from Rs 200 to 400, with a bonus claim of 20 per cent. The other claims included regularisation of the jobs of badli workers, provision of allowances towards leave travel, house rent and so on. Along with a wage increase, the MGKU also demanded that the government scrap the Bombay Industrial Act, 1946, and de-recognise the monopoly official union status of RMMS.

 

The Mill Owners’ Association of Bombay rejected all the economic demands and viewed them as totally unacceptable. The mill owners pointed out that even the central government did not want them to yield, because it would lead to undesirable repercussions in other sectors (for example, ports and docks) and industrial regions. The state government of Maharashtra took a strong stand by calling the strike illegal, because the officially recognised union did not own it. Accordingly, the government dismissed any possibility of a dialogue with the leaders of non-recognised unions, including Datta Samant. Opposing this, Datta Samant considered the agreements signed by RMMS as not binding and refused to accept the representative status of the monopoly union, since it secured the same through an inflexible legal framework rather than popular worker backing. One of the prominent factors that led to the ultimate failure of the strike was the limited scope for mediation, negotiation and resolution, owing to the obstinacy of government and the non-compromising attitude of Samant.

 

The strike commanded massive worker support, despite the blatant and continued opposition from the RMMS, the Mill Owners’ Association, and the state and central governments. The Mill Owners’ Association and the state government used several pressure tactics to break the strike. In an attempt to force the agitators back to work unconditionally, the owners immediately followed the strike call with a lockout. Further, the workers’ wages for the month of January, already earned before the declaration of the strike and the lock out, were illegally withheld. The government closed all doors for conciliation and resolution, which made resolving the strike a distant possibility.

 

The majority of the workers continued their struggles against all economic odds. Even after six months of suffering, only 7 per cent of the total textile workforce had resumed work. Nevertheless, the workers could not continue with the hardships for so long and, in the absence of any forums for effective social dialogue, the strike gradually lost its momentum. Though the strike was never officially called off, its failure was widely acknowledged by July 1983.

 

The strike of 1982 resulted in massive layoffs, amounting to nearly 75,000 jobs lost. Many of the entrepreneurs also used the strike as a justification for closing down their mills or declaring them sick, with an agenda of reassigning their prime land for more profitable ventures. The strike also led to the migration of the textile mill industry from the city. By mid-1980s, several of the mills had moved outside Bombay. This massive closure and exodus of mills left tens of thousands of mill workers unemployed. Thus, in a way, the strike was a decisive factor that contributed to the destruction of textile mill industry in Bombay. It was also the turning point that determined the geographic transformation of the city to its present form.

 

Datta Samant: A Unique Trade Unionist

The most influential personality in the Bombay textile strike was Datta Samant, who commanded a broad-based popularity among the working class. The entire strike revolved around his charisma, which was crucial in mass mobilisation of the mill workers. A trained doctor, Samant hailed from a working class background and his past record of success in organising strikes and winning substantial wage hikes was appealing to the workers in the region. He emerged as the unexpected leader of the strike, and left a strong imprint in the industrial disputes history of India by his personalised style of functioning.

 

Samant’s growing popularity among the workers, and his adamant positions while leading the struggle earned him a label of a ‘militant’ trade unionist. Datta Samant grew as a prominent INTUC leader and turned increasingly radical in his political convictions and activism. Notwithstanding this, labour historians such as Hubert van Wersch explain that the ‘militant’ image attached to the leader and his union was a bit exaggerated. Although, the strike turned out to be a failure, Samant continued to mesmerise the working class in Mumbai. His victory as an independent candidate to the Lok Sabha in 1984 substantiates this.  The saga of Samant attained yet another dimension, when he was fired upon and killed by unidentified assassins, again on a mid-January morning – just two day’s prior to the observance of 15th anniversary of the historic beginning of 1982 strike.

 

Despite its relative failure, the Bombay textile strike of 1982 is considered a radical chapter in the history of Indian labour. Similarly, the imprint left by Datta Samant is also unique in the trade union movement of the country.

 

(Major Sources: Hubert W. M. van Wersch (1992) Bombay Textile Strike: 1982-83, Oxford University Press, Bombay; Salim Lakha (1986): Organised Labour and Militant Unionism: The Textile Workers’ Strike of 1982, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 20)`

 

 

Author Name: Babu P. Remesh
Title of the Article: Recalling the Bombay Textile Workers’ Strike, 1982
Name of the Journal: Labour File
Volume & Issue: 5 , 2
Year of Publication: 2007
Month of Publication: January - April
Page numbers in Printed version: Labour File, Vol.5-No.1&2, Trade Union Verification: All About Numbers (Labour in Those Years - Recalling the Bombay Textile Workers’ Strike, 1982 - pp 96 - 98)
Weblink : https://www.labourfile.com:443/section-detail.php?aid=417

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