The enunciation of social justice as a guiding principle of Indian Constitution led to the promulgation of a large number of welfare legislations for industrial labour. These laws were enacted with a clear understanding and mandate to secure egalitarian conditions for the industrial workers, who did not have adequate countervailing power - political, economic or social - in comparison to their counterparts, the industrial employers.

Keeping in view this mandate, while deciding claims under welfare statutes, our judiciary has consistently preferred to adopt the principle of ‘liberal interpretation’ as against the usual practice of literal interpretation of statutes. Liberal interpretation principle calls for broader interpretation of statutory provisions keeping the ‘spirit’ of the statute alive rather than taking a narrow and strict interpretation restricting the scope and coverage of legislations as well as defeating its true purpose.

A recent judgement by the Supreme Court reaffirms this practice in the case of Uttar Pradesh Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Co.Ltd. vs Ramanuj Yadav and Others [2003 8 SCC 334]. This case was regarding true interpretation of Sections 6-N & 2(g) of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act,1947 pertaining to interpretation and scope of the definition of ‘continuous service’ and consequent benefits available to a worker upon retrenchment.

Facts of the Case
Twenty- nine casual workers were dismissed from service by the Uttar Pradesh.Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Co.Ltd. with effect from 31 March.1987. These labourers had worked for more than 240 days in each of the calendar year from 1983 to 1987 but had not completed 240 days work in the 12 months immediately preceding their date of termination. The workes challenged their termination order as violative of Section 6 N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, which cast a duty upon the employer to give a notice of one month or wages in lieu of notice and pay compensation to the worker before effecting retrenchment.

The employer’s argument was that since the workmen had not worked for 240 days in the immediately preceding 12 months, they have not fulfilled the requirements of the definition of ‘continuous service’ under Section 2(g) of the Act. The Labour Court of Lucknow, in its award dated 31 May 1991 concluded that the workers were not entitled to protection under Section 6 N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. Some of the workers challenged this award in the High Court. The High Court set aside the award and ruled in favour of the workers and held that their termination was illegal under Section 6 N of the Industrial Disputes Act. The definition of ‘continuous service’ under Section 2(g) of the Industrial Disputes Act is similar to the definition of the term under Section 25 B of the Industrial Disputes Act, except that in the case of the former provision, the relevant duration of 12 calendar months in which a worker should have worked for more than 240 days is not qualified by the word ‘precedent’ whereas in case of the Industrial Dispute Act, Section 25 B contains the qualification ‘precedent’ before the phrase ‘twelve calendar months’.

Judgement
The Supreme Court in its judgement upheld the decision of the High Court granting reinstatement of discharged workers observing that in its earlier judgement in the case of Surendrakumar Verma Vs Central Government. Industrial Tribunal [1980 4 SCC 443] it has already clarified that semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of ‘bread and butter’ statutes; welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation and where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions. According to the judgement, if the court accepted the literal interpretation of the words ‘twelve months’ used in the definition of ‘continuous service’ as meaning immediately preceding 12 months before termination; disregarding earlier service record of the workmen who have worked for more than 240 days in the past years, it would amount to denial of substantive right granted by the welfare legislation on narrow procedural or technical ground. This can not be the intention of the legislature, otherwise such a practice can be used by the employer as a handle for abusing workers’ rights, observed the Supreme Court while ordering reinstatement of the workers.